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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TAX-EXEMPT HOSPITALS: WHAT IS THEIR CHARITABLE
RESPONSIBILITY AND HOW SHOULD IT BE DEFINED AND
REPORTED?

NANCY M. KANE, DBA*

I. INTRODUCTION
In ancient Greece, taking money in exchange for providing life-saving
services was grounds for electrocution by the gods. When Zeus was informed
that Asclepius, the founder of medicine, was “bribed with gold” to bring the
dead back to life, Zeus struck him dead with a thunderbolt.1 The ancient
tension between being a healer and getting paid to heal continues today in
modern America. Now it is not an issue of whether healers should be paid, but
rather, how much is paid, how the fee is collected, and whether or not the
healers properly report their activities to the public. In Zeus’ place are many
public officials, from federal and state lawmakers and enforcers to the I.R.S.
and county tax authorities, all deeply concerned about whether nonprofit, taxexempt hospitals deserve their tax-exemptions.
II. THE GATHERING STORM
In 2003, a series of articles in The Wall Street Journal detailed aggressive
billing and debt collection practices of a number of highly respected nonprofit
hospitals, marking the beginning of an upsurge in public attention to the
charitable behavior of hospitals.2 Class action lawsuits about unfair billing and
collection practices and inadequate provision of charity care were filed in 2004
against hundreds of hospitals nationwide, spearheaded by Richard Scruggs, a
lawyer who helped the states win huge settlements from the tobacco industry
in the 1990s. In 2005, two powerful members of Congress, Representative Bill
Thomas (California), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and
* Professor of Management, Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard School of
Public Health. DBA and MBA, Harvard Business School; B.S., Simmons College.
1. ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEK MYTHS 175 (Penguin Books 1964); see Ron Leadbetter,
Asclepius, Enclyopedia Mythica, http://www.pantheon.org/articles/a/asclepius.html (last visited
Jan. 8, 2007).
2. See Lucette Lagnado, Full Price: A Young Woman, an Appendectomy, and a $19,000
Debt, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at A1; Lucette Lagnado, Twenty Years and Still Paying:
Jeanette White Is Long Dead But Her Hospital Bill Lives On, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2003, at B1.
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Senator Charles E. Grassley (Iowa), Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, began publicly questioning the value of hospital tax-exemption
compared to the benefit the community received from them. According to
Grassley, “Too many [hospitals] do little to nothing. Too often, it seems that
tax-exempt hospitals offer less charitable care and community benefit than forprofit hospitals.”3 Grassley has also expressed concern about hospital
executive compensation levels, joint ventures with commercial organizations,
and hospital for-profit subsidiaries.4 Thomas explained, “Congress has a
responsibility to assure the American taxpayer that the tax-exempt hospital
sector is living up to its community responsibilities.”5
Meanwhile, for 2006, the I.R.S. announced a stronger enforcement
presence for nonprofit hospitals, citing concern over hospital practices in the
areas of executive compensation, community benefit accountability, and the
use of the proceeds of tax-exempt bonds.6 As part of that effort, they sent out
nearly six hundred “compliance check” letters to nonprofit hospitals requesting
answers to eighty detailed questions.7
Between 2004 and 2006, state and local officials have also stepped up their
challenges of hospital charitable behavior and tax-exempt status. From New
Hampshire to Utah, state legislators and attorneys general have been actively
questioning the appropriateness of billing and collection practices, while
challenging tax-exemption requests for hospital-acquired property and
businesses that were previously tax-paying. In New Hampshire, the legislature
set up a committee to study hospital property tax exemptions.8 After a year of
work, the committee cited continuing interest but offered no concrete proposals
other than that hospitals should be required to report their financial statements
to the public.9 In Ohio, the Ohio Tax Commissioner denied a local tax
exemption for Cleveland Clinic’s newly acquired clinic in a wealthy suburb
because it provided minimal charity care.10 In Illinois, the state passed
legislation requiring community benefit reporting in 2003; in 2006, the state
3. Robert Pear, I.R.S. Checking Compliance by Tax-Exempt Hospitals: Inquiry May Bring
Changes in Standards, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2006, at A15.
4. Letter from Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, to
Richard J. Davidson, President, American Hospital Association (Mar. 8, 2006), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/prg030806aha.pdf.
5. Luiza Ch. Savage, Senator Eyes City Hospital in Tax Debate, N.Y. SUN, May 26, 2005,
at A1.
6. David M. Flynn & Philip H. Lebowitz, 2006 Exempt Organizations (EO) Implementing
Guidelines (Nov. 15, 2005), available at http://www.mondaq.com.
7. Pear, supra note 3.
8. Roger Talbot, State Eyes Hospitals’ Tax-Exempt Status, UNION LEADER (Manchester,
N.H.), Dec. 18, 2005, at A12.
9. Id.
10. Sarah Treffinger, Ruling Presents New Challenge to Hospitals’ Tax-Exempt Status,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 27, 2005, at B6.
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Attorney General proposed legislation (H.B. 5000) requiring minimum charity
expenditures by nonprofit hospitals.11 In North Carolina, a bill was proposed
that would limit the types of property that can be exempt and would require
provision of a minimum level of charity care expenditure.12 In Kansas, the
Attorney General opened an investigation of hospital billing and collection
practices.13 In Utah, Intermountain Health agreed to less aggressive debt
collection practices under pressure from the legislature.14 In Minnesota, the
Attorney General investigated aggressive debt collection and inadequate
provision of charity care, forcing four hospital systems to agree to discount
charges to the uninsured by 40 to 60%.15 In 2005, eight states proposed bills
regarding the provision of charity care and billing practices.16 While little has
actually passed into law, it may be just a matter of time before a higher
standard of charitable behavior will be established by certain states, and the
federal government is likely to pass a bill in the near future.17 Representative
Bill Thomas proposed the Tax Exempt Hospitals Responsibility Act of 2006,
which would impose penalties on nonprofit hospitals failing to provide a
minimum level of charity care, among other things.18
III. MAJOR THEMES TO RECENT TAX-EXEMPT CHALLENGES
The issues involved in state and federal challenges to hospital taxexemption are much broader than simply how much charity care hospitals
provide.
They include excessive pricing, excessive personal gain,
demonstrable value for the value of tax exemption, transparency, and
accountability. This range of issues gives the political forces challenging
nonprofit hospitals access to a more powerful spectrum of stakeholders than
just advocates for the uninsured. It creates odd bedfellows coupling politically
conservative advocates of health savings accounts (HSAs) with liberal
consumer advocacy groups concerned about vulnerable populations of
uninsured Americans. Local towns and school districts starving for tax
revenue are leading the charge in some states. One sign of the widening
political appeal of the issue was a recent 60 Minutes segment that was critical

11. Editorial, Charity Standard, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 2006, at A49.
12. Hamilton C. Horton, Jr., Re-Examine Tax-Exempt Status for Hospitals, WINSTONSALEM J., June 11, 2005, at A11.
13. Robert Pear, Nonprofit Hospitals Face Scrutiny Over Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2006, at 18.
14. Brian Baskin, Fixing Charity Issues Seems Somebody Else’s Problem, ARK. DEMOCRATGAZETTE, July 3, 2005.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Reform of Law on Tax-Exempts Inevitable, But Impact on Hospitals Seen Uncertain, 16
BNA’S MEDICARE REP. 1296 (2005).
18. H.R. 6420, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2006).
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of hospitals’ charitable behavior.19 A deeper understanding of the hospital
behaviors generating the political momentum clarifies why policy change is
likely and why the momentum is not tied to hospital provision of charity care
alone.
A. Excessive Pricing
Excessive pricing itself is multifaceted, with each facet bringing in a new
set of political interests. The most obvious group subject to excessive pricing
are the uninsured, who are routinely charged prices that are between two to six
times the cost to produce the service. They are then aggressively pursued by
debt collection agencies for years.
While charges that bear little resemblance to cost may have had relatively
benign motivations twenty-five years ago,20 they have become highly visible
symbols of nonprofit hospital “corporate” behavior toward the defenseless
consumer. Average collection rates on these inflated bills run roughly 20% of
the cost (not charges) of care,21 which implies that only pennies on the dollar
amounts billed are actually collected. Yet some nonprofit hospitals pursue
former patients to extremes including putting liens on homes, garnishing
wages, and even imprisoning debtors.22 Intended or not, aggressive debt
collection practices discourage patients with medical debt from returning for
additional care.
The impact on people owing the bills, regardless of whether they pay, can
be disastrous. People with high medical indebtedness (whether insured or not)
are less likely than others to seek appropriate medical care when needed and
will curtail activities that might result in injuries, such as participation in
Many people with medically-related debt file for personal
sports.23
bankruptcy. These vulnerable people constitute the working poor and the
middle class, a large segment of U.S. society.
A very different constituency concerned about excessively high hospital
prices are commercial health insurers, backed by conservative policymakers
who believe that high-deductible health plans (HDHPs), coupled with taxsubsidized HSAs, will be the magic bullet that slows the rate of health care
cost increases in the country. HDHPs and HSAs could give consumers strong
financial incentives to exercise “individual responsibility” for their health care
choices through choosing less expensive providers and avoiding unnecessary
19. 60 Minutes: Is the Price Right? (CBS television broadcast Mar. 5, 2006).
20. See Pricing Practices of Hospitals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 13–14 (2004) (statement of Nancy M. Kane, DBA,
Harvard Sch. of Pub. Health).
21. See MEDPAC REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: SELECTED MEDICARE ISSUES, 186 tbl. C-12
(June 2000) (classifying bad debtors under the “uncompensated care” payer category).
22. Editorial, supra note 11.
23. Hugh F. Daly III et al., Into the Red to Stay in the Pink: The Hidden Cost of Being
Uninsured, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 39, 43, 58–59 (2002).
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care. However, excessive hospital prices charged to the self-paying patient
present a major obstacle to the realization of effective consumer purchasing.
This latter group may be the political force behind congressional pressures
on the Office of the Inspector General to adopt as a final regulation a 2003
proposed rule that defines “excessive prices” to Medicare. The proposed rule
suggests that hospital prices be considered excessive if they are greater than
120% of average net payments of all private sector payers, excluding charity
discounts and capitated payments.24 Such a rule, if implemented, would
threaten hospitals with exclusion from participating in the Medicare program if
they submitted claims found to contain excessive charges. Since hospitals are
not allowed to have different charge-masters for different patient-payer classes
(discriminatory pricing), prices would have to be adjusted for all patients,
including direct-pay patients to a level compliant with the 120% rule. With
private sector discounts averaging roughly 50% of charges, such a rule could
lower charges to self-paying patients by roughly 40% off current levels.
Perhaps even more important, Medicare would be brought into the pricing
battle as both a directly affected party (some Medicare payments are
influenced by hospital charges) as well as potentially becoming the regulatory
and administrative vehicle that collects hospital charges and private sector
discounts, investigates them for reasonableness, and makes that data available
to the public.
B.

Excessive Personal Gain

This concern, too, is multifaceted. Most visible is the level of executive
compensation that hospital boards approve. According to one source,
nonprofit executive salaries have grown by 20 to 30% per year over the past
five years (2000–2005), far exceeding the pay raises of other workers.25
Health system executives earning over a million dollars in annual salary and
retiring with $5 to $6 million “golden handshakes” at a time when low-wage
hospital employees have to enroll their children in Medicaid catches the
attention of policymakers and the I.R.S. In 2005, the I.R.S. Commissioner,
Mark Everson, announced a crackdown on excessive compensation within taxexempt organizations, and Senator Grassley included detailed questions about
executive compensation and benefits in his letters to ten hospitals requesting
information about what makes them charitable.26

24. Medicare and Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of Terms
and Application of Program Exclusion Authority for Submitting Claims Containing Excessive
Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,939, 53,942 (Sept. 15, 2003).
25. Joe Rojas-Burke, Scrutiny Rises with Hospital Paychecks, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 22,
2005, at A1.
26. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 5.
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Besides executives, policymakers are concerned about hospital-physician
joint ventures in which the hospital may provide the capital and/or share the
operating risk with physician owners of profitable freestanding services in
imaging, laboratory, day surgery, and specialty inpatient care. Such ventures
are often driven by physicians seeking to enhance their income, which has
declined in real dollars in recent years as the payment environment has
tightened.27 One of Senator Grassley’s questions that hospitals were asked to
respond to included whether they agreed that “[m]any nonprofit, tax-exempt
hospitals engage in joint ventures that shift the most profitable and valuable
procedures, practices, and income streams to the joint ventures so that the
greater profits and value may be shared with physicians and other for-profit
persons.”28
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas expressed
concern that hospitals have become “increasingly commercial” in their
operations.29 Hospitals have diversified into many businesses in the last
twenty years, from health insurance and physician practices to assisted living
facilities, software companies, and even venture funds investing in the
commercialization of medical discoveries. Many of these business ventures
are for-profit, owned solely by the health system or in partnership with a forprofit organization. Some turn out to be expensive business failures financed
by charitable dollars.30 The magnitude of investment and return are very
difficult to detect as multiple entities are involved, only some of which must
file a 990 tax return with the I.R.S. Over ten years ago, this movement into
commercial operations was recognized by some as likely to negatively impact
the social mission of hospitals. In January 1995, Cardinal Joseph Bernadin
was quoted as saying, “I am becoming increasingly concerned that our
healthcare delivery system is rapidly commercializing itself, and in the process
is abandoning core values that should always be at the heart of healthcare.”31
Ten years later, growing controversy over hospital tax-exemption reflects
society’s recognition that, indeed, commercialization and charity are often
incompatible core values.

27. Ha T. Tu & Paul B. Ginsburg, Losing Ground: Physician Income, 1995–2003,
TRACKING REP. 15 (Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change), June 2006, at 1.
28. Savage, supra note 5.
29. Id.
30. See Lawton R. Burns et al., The Financial Performance of Integrated Health
Organizations, J. OF HEALTHCARE MGMT 191, 206 (May–June 2005).
31. David W. Johnson, Managing Director, Citigroup, Presentation at Harvard School of
Public Health, Financing the Future: Healthcare Trends and Their Impact on Capital Funding
(Mar. 18, 2005).
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C. Demonstrable Value for Tax Exemption
In 2005, in response to a request by the House Ways and Means
Committee, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) produced a report
on differences found in the provision of uncompensated care (bad debt and free
care combined) among private nonprofit, publicly-owned, and investor-owned
hospitals.32
They concluded that government hospitals maintained
significantly higher uncompensated care burdens (defined as the ratio of
uncompensated care relative to total operating expense) than the other groups,
while nonprofit private and investor-owned hospitals showed only small
differences in uncompensated care burden.33 Furthermore, only a very small
proportion of hospitals provided the bulk of the private nonprofit
uncompensated care burden.34 The GAO commented that
current tax policy lacks specific criteria with respect to tax exemptions for
charitable entities . . . . If these criteria are articulated in accordance with
desired goals, standards could be established that would allow nonprofit
hospitals to be held accountable for providing services of benefit to the public
35
commensurate with their favored tax status.

Studies comparing the value of tax exemptions to the provision of charity
care have found that most hospitals would not earn their tax exemption on the
value of charity care alone, particularly when charity care is expressed in terms
of costs, not charges.36 Hospitals argue that they provide many community
benefits other than charity care, and that these benefits should be considered
when comparing value for tax exemption. However, even within the hospital
industry there is disagreement as to which activities should justify tax
exemption. Currently, for instance, the American Hospital Association (AHA)
disagrees with the Catholic Healthcare Association (CHA) over whether bad
debt expense and “Medicare shortfalls” (excess of cost over payment) should
be considered community benefits, with the AHA asserting that they should be

32. DAVID M. WALKER, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
UNITED STATES, NONPROFIT, FOR-PROFIT, AND GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS:
UNCOMPENSATED CARE AND OTHER COMMUNITY BENEFITS (May 2005).
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 19.
36. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND THE PROVISION OF COMMUNITY
BENEFITS (Dec. 2006); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., NONPROFIT HOSPITALS: BETTER STANDARDS
NEEDED FOR TAX EXEMPTION (May 1990); HEATHER O’DONNEL & RALPH MARTIRE, CTR. FOR
TAX AND BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE TAX EXEMPTIONS GRANTED TO
COOK COUNTY NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS AND THE CHARITY CARE PROVIDED IN RETURN (2006);
Nancy M. Kane & William H. Wubbenhorst, Alternative Funding Policies for the Uninsured:
Exploring the Value of Hospital Tax Exemption, 78 MILBANK Q. 185, 199 (2000).
THE
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considered and the CHA saying they should not.37 The GAO study discussed
earlier noted that hospitals reported a wide range of other community benefits,
but that there was no clear pattern distinguishing nonprofit from investorowned hospital groups.38 Furthermore, there was no independent audit or
meaningful monitoring of the data reported to states, and states that required
community benefit reporting were not routinely using the data to review
hospital tax status.39 The Commissioner of the I.R.S., Mark Everson, was
quoted as saying that agents “often found little difference between nonprofit
and for-profit hospitals ‘in their operations, their attention to the benefit of the
community, or their levels of charity care.’”40
Besides questioning the value of charity care and other community benefits
relative to the value of tax exemption, federal policymakers are exploring the
distribution and use of tax-exempt bonds when hospitals could have used
internal assets to meet their capital investment needs. Termed “tax arbitrage,”
some large nonprofit hospital systems borrow using tax-exempt bonds even
though they have investment assets (unrestricted marketable securities that
were earned through unrestricted gifts, investment income, retained earnings,
and funded depreciation) that could cover some or all of the cost of needed
capital projects. Hospitals engage in tax arbitrage when the tax-subsidized cost
of borrowing is below the returns they can earn on investment assets. As one
hospital system noted in its 1999 Bond Prospectus: “Management has taken a
pro-active approach to managing the debt position and the investment portfolio
for the System. The overall weighted average interest rate on long-term debt is
5.50%, while the overall investment portfolio has generated an average annual
return in excess of 14%.”41
One study found that over half the tax-exempt debt held by hospitals in
1996 could have been eliminated if hospitals had used their “endowment
assets” before borrowing.42 The same study also found that both endowment
assets and tax-exempt bonds are concentrated in a minority of hospitals,
indicating that tax subsidies are benefiting cash-rich hospitals while not
helping those cash-poor hospitals most in need of outside financing.43
Congress and the I.R.S. are now looking into whether this is an appropriate use
of tax-exempt bonds, which represent a significant “tax expenditure” of the

37. David Burda, Stop Playing Politics with Charity, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 5, 2006, at
20.
38. WALKER, supra note 32, at 3–4.
39. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 36, at 20.
40. Pear, supra note 13.
41. Official Statement for Revenue Bonds, Series 1999 A, UPMC Health System, A-15.
42. William M. Gentry, Debt, Investment, and Endowment Accumulation: The Case of Notfor-Profit Hospitals, 21 J. OF HEALTH ECON. 845, 871 (2002).
43. Id. at 870.
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federal government.44 With over $100 billion in tax-exempt debt outstanding
as of 2002, the possibility that half was used for tax arbitrage rather than for
expanding access to capital for cash-strapped hospitals could generate even
more taxpayer indignation.45
A final area of broad inquiry into the value of tax exemption comes from
the local level, where property tax exemption requests by hospitals are
increasingly meeting resistance by local tax authorities. In 2005, the Fiscal
Research staff of the North Carolina General Legislature noted that tax-exempt
hospitals represent as much as 2% of total county property value in the state,
and that the percentage was growing as hospitals acquired medical office
buildings and residential real estate.46 This finding prompted proposed Senate
Bill 175, which would require that rental housing, physician offices off
hospital grounds, and health clubs and child care facilities open to the public
be subject to county property taxes.47 New Hampshire’s General Legislature
appointed a committee to “study the exemption from property taxes for notfor-profit hospitals.”48 Among its conclusions was that hospital acquisitions of
doctors’ clinics and offices had “defeated the legislative intent of broadening
the business tax base,” referring to the Business Enterprise Tax, enacted in
1993.49
In more substantive action, the Ohio Tax Commissioner recently ruled
against Cleveland Clinic’s request to extend its tax exemption to an acquired
family health and surgery center in a wealthy suburb.50 Here, the Beachwood
school district contested the request, claiming that the clinic itself provided
little to no charity.51 While the Cleveland Clinic appeals that ruling, certain
Cleveland-area school districts are challenging the tax-exempt status of other
Cleveland Clinic properties, worth an expected $17 million for the Clinic and
its system as a whole.52
In all of these property tax challenges and investigations, the amount of
charity provided was considered as part of the expected value that localities
considered. As the North Carolina legislature and others have discovered, the
value of charity care provided varies considerably within a geographicallydefined group of nonprofit hospitals, as well as within facility members of a

44. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFF., NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND TAX ARBITRAGE (Dec.
2006).
45. The amount of tax-exempt financing outstanding in 2002 was between $94 billion and
$124 billion. Email from Dennis Zimmerman, CBO Analyst (Aug. 9, 2006) (on file with author).
46. Horton, supra note 12.
47. Id.
48. Talbot, supra note 8.
49. Id.
50. Treffinger, supra note 10.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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hospital system. The New Hampshire committee report pointed out that
historically, charity was “the reason that led the legislature to grant these
hospitals tax exemption.”53 However, all parties to these studies point out that
the charity standard is not well articulated and is insufficient for today’s health
care system.
D. Transparency
The lack of transparency of hospital activities adds fuel to the fire of public
ire and policymakers’ distrust. Inadequate public reporting of charity care and
community benefits is common. This is apparently a problem across the
nonprofit sector. One of the major recommendations of the Panel on the
Nonprofit Sector’s June 2005 Report to Congress is that “[i]nformation about
the organization’s charitable purpose and key program achievements should be
included on the first pages of the Forms.”54 Part of that can be changed by
policymakers themselves; neither the I.R.S. Form 990 nor the Medicare Cost
Report, the only two national sources of mandatory public reporting by
nonprofit hospitals, has a standard definition of charity care or a fixed place to
report it in their forms. Unfortunately, a recent attempt by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services to require uncompensated care information
(the new Schedule 10) suffers from ambiguous reporting instructions,
rendering the 2004 reported results unusable.55
Meanwhile, the Catholic Healthcare Association, the Voluntary Hospital
Association, the American Hospital Association, and others have attempted to
standardize reporting for community benefits—both charity and other types of
activities—but the standards are voluntary and vary with the source. A
significant area of disagreement is how to count bad debts, as well as the
“Medicare shortfall.” State efforts to define a standard for community benefit
have been undermined at times by industry insistence that the broadest possible
definition be used, thus rendering a standard or requirement meaningless.56
Not only do many hospitals fail to inform the public and tax authorities of
their charitable activities, but they also fail to inform their patients of charity
care eligibility and availability policies. One of the most egregious allegations
against Yale-New Haven Hospital, described in a 2003 report authored by a
staff researcher of the Service Employees International Union, was that the
53. Talbot, supra note 8.
54. PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 27 (June 2005).
55. See Jack Ashby & Craig Lisk, Presentation before the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, Public Meeting, 176, 183–85 (Nov. 8, 2006), http://www.medpac.gov/
public_meetings/transcripts/1108_1109_medpac.final.pdf.
56. For instance, see the Utah community benefit standard as described in Alice A. Noble,
Andrew L. Hyams & Nancy M. Kane, Charitable Hospital Accountability: A Review and Analysis of
Legal and Policy Initiatives, J. L. MED. & ETHICS, Spring 1998, at 116, 121.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

TAX-EXEMPT HOSPITALS

469

hospital had a large, donor-restricted fund dedicated to providing free care to
qualified patients, yet the hospital chose instead to pursue indigent patients as
bad debtors.57 Many indigent patients never knew of the existence of charity
funds. As one dunned uninsured former patient said, “I asked Yale-New
Haven’s triage and billing staff if the Hospital had charity care. They said no.
The doctors and nurses all said they didn’t know anything.”58 Meanwhile from
1996 to 2001, the free care fund more than doubled in value, while free care
provision decreased by 46% and bad debt expense rose by 50%.59
Finally, pricing transparency remains a major problem for hospitals and for
those who want consumers to become more effective purchasers of care.
While it is difficult if not impossible to know in advance every service and
procedure that a patient might receive for a given condition, it is possible to put
the combined average prices of the bundle of services required for common
treatments and procedures such as normal deliveries, standard radiology exams
and lab tests, or a trip to the emergency room on a public web site. Some
states have passed legislation recently requiring public disclosure of prices of
common inpatient and outpatient services or procedures.
E.

Accountability

The United States is unique among industrialized nations in its reliance
upon private nonprofit charitable hospitals competing for resources in a
market-oriented, fragmented payment environment. Other countries have
independent nonprofit hospitals but these institutions generally must be
accountable to a public authority that controls the funds, such as a provincial or
national health authority whose primary responsibility is the health of a
geographic area. Also, most wealthy industrialized nations do not have
millions of uninsured people. In the U.S., no public entity is responsible for
the health of a geographic area; instead, geographic areas are viewed as
“markets” within which hospitals compete for paying patients and try to keep
the nonpaying patients from putting them at a serious competitive
disadvantage. The private nonprofit hospital in the U.S. is also uniquely
dependent upon private markets for capital financing, which further raises the
pressure on hospitals to be driven by economic concerns.
Accountability for the charitable behavior of a nonprofit private hospital in
the U.S. rests officially with its board, which is a self-perpetuating group of
citizens often chosen for their role as donors, rather than as overseers of the
hospital’s charitable mission. Even highly conscientious board members find
it challenging to understand the complexities of modern hospital enterprise,
57. GRACE ROLLINS, CONN. CTR. FOR A NEW ECON., UNCHARITABLE CARE: YALE-NEW
HAVEN HOSPITAL’S CHARITY CARE AND COLLECTIONS PRACTICES 11–12 (Jan. 2003).
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 16.
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and CEOs do not always fully inform their boards about sensitive issues such
as how self-pay patients are billed or even about the details of executive
compensation.
Egregious malfeasance may be challenged by the state attorney general,
but this is rare because most state attorneys general have many competing
interests as well as very limited resources with which to monitor nonprofit
hospital behavior. The I.R.S. receives Form 990 filings from hospitals every
year, but it lacks the resources to even review the forms, much less determine
whether or not the content is valid or the reported activities appropriate. From
1996 through 2001, staffing for the tax-exempt division of the I.R.S. fell by
15%, while the number of Form 900s filed by charities increased by 25%.60
The Form 990 examination rate for all charities was less than 1% over that
period.61 Even with more resources and reviews, the information in the Form
990 does not allow the I.R.S. to determine whether or not a hospital is fulfilling
its charitable mission. While the I.R.S. is now stepping up its efforts to review
and investigate nonprofit hospitals and other tax-exempt entities with respect
to whether or not their charitable status is merited, it still lacks a clear standard
by which to make that judgment.
Our unique system of hospital accountability provides the greatest level of
institutional discretion, thus fostering innovation and responsiveness to local
opportunity. However, it has a negative side, which includes resistance to
external accountability and the potential for excessive responsiveness to
economic incentives to the detriment of charitable responsibilities.
III. CONCLUSION
Much of the public uproar about hospitals’ behavior with respect to their
charitable obligations is not about illegal behavior, but about behavior that falls
below broadly held social expectations of charitable hospitals and health
systems. As a judge ruling on one of the class action lawsuits over hospital
charity care and billing practices wrote, “[P]laintiffs have come to the judicial
branch for relief that may only be granted by the legislative branch.”62 It is
likely that laws will be passed that better reflect these emerging social
expectations.
The range of federal policy options goes from simply revoking tax-exempt
status to setting a higher and more articulated standard for tax-exemption that
addresses at least some of the five broad issues described here.

60. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN
PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES 3 (Apr. 2002).
61. Id. at 22.
62. Pear, supra note 13 (quoting Judge Loretta A. Preska of the Federal District Court in
Manhattan about a ruling against the class action plaintiffs in 2005).
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The option of simply revoking tax-exempt status for hospitals has a
number of critical drawbacks. One is that it punishes a whole industry,
including the many hospitals that have responsibly balanced their charitable
mission with their financial requirements and have maintained a high degree of
transparency and accountability to their communities. Another drawback is
that the value lost to hospitals would greatly exceed the gain in federal tax
revenues, as federal tax-exempt status is required for hospitals to receive most
grants and donations and qualifies hospitals for state and local exemptions and
tax-exempt debt. Perhaps most important, charitable nonprofit status is still
associated with community trust, an intangible asset with enormous value in
many markets.
Loss of tax exemption would push nonprofit hospitals into joining the
investor-owned for-profit sector—a group that profits from cherry-picking
locations and services.63 Investor-owned hospitals have also been particularly
adept at exploiting loopholes in complex tax and payment systems,
experiencing regular cycles of litigation and settlement costs over such
activities as fraudulent Medicare billing and reporting practices, inappropriate
medical care, and I.R.S. tax challenges.
Far better would be for Congress to define a higher standard for federal tax
exemption, one which articulates meaningful behavioral expectations of taxexempt hospitals. These could include:
 Requiring that eligibility for charity or discounted care be tied to the
magnitude of the self-pay portion of the bill relative to the patient’s
financial resources, regardless of patient insurance status. The I.R.S.
would regularly review this policy for reasonableness and require that it be
provided on a standardized disclosure form attached to the I.R.S. Form
990 and on the hospital’s web site. While this could encourage some
people to not buy health insurance or to buy high-deductible plans without
HSAs,64 it is already the case that self-paying people expect (and take)
“discounts” when they cannot pay the bill. There is some evidence that if
the bill is set at a level that they can reasonably be expected to pay,
patients are more likely to pay it.65
 Requiring that hospitals and related health service-providing entities
ensure that patients are aware of the availability of charity care and
discounted care. Part of the requirement would be a regular monitoring of
the level of awareness in the community of the hospital’s charity care and

63. See Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and
Ethics of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1382–1383 (2003).
64. Bradley Herring, The Effect of the Availability of Charity Care to the Uninsured on the
Demand for Private Health Insurance, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 225, 241 (2005).
65. James Unland, Letters to the Editor: Unfair Attack on Hospitals, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2006, at 32.
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discounted care policies, particularly among the most vulnerable
populations.
 Requiring that hospitals justify to the I.R.S. their debt collection practices
(and those of their agents) in terms of methods used and collection rates
(amounts collected relative to amounts owed) over a rolling five-year
period. The I.R.S. would regularly review these reports to ensure that
hospitals and their agents are not using aggressive debt collection practices
primarily to discourage access to health services (for example, very low
collection rates associated with highly aggressive collection tactics).
 Requiring that hospitals partner with community groups and agencies to
improve access to care for vulnerable populations in their service area,
with regular reports to both the I.R.S. and the hospital or system board.
 Requiring that hospitals produce a community benefit report as an
attachment to the I.R.S. Form 990 and available on the hospitals’ web sites
that is compliant with the voluntary reporting guidelines established by the
Catholic Healthcare Association and its collaborators. Any deviance from
the guidelines should be highlighted and the impact noted (e.g., inclusion
of bad debt or Medicare shortfalls should be separately identified if
reported at all).
 Requiring that hospital boards maintain a permanent “tax-exempt
compliance” committee responsible for review, monitoring, and reporting
on charity care policies and provision, other community benefits,
collection policies, executive compensation, and joint venture
arrangements, as well as the transparent reporting of such activities to the
public and the I.R.S. The committee should regularly review hospital bad
debt collection practices and collection rates and develop means of
assessing billing and collection impact on the health of patients who owe
money or are uninsured in the community.
These guidelines would not be onerous for the many hospitals seeking to
behave appropriately. However, they would set forth more clearly than does
current law what behaviors are expected of our charitable hospitals. These do
not address some of the issues under debate today, such as pricing transparency
for individual purchasers or how to deal with the use of tax-exempt financing
proceeds if “tax arbitrage” is not consistent with congressional goals for
subsidizing hospital debt. These activities may best be addressed separately
from the general issue of a standard for charitable tax exemption, as they are
amenable to adjustments in regulations already governing Medicare
participation and eligibility for tax-exempt financing.
Some might argue that defining a higher standard of behavior for
charitable tax-exempt status gives for-profit hospitals a competitive advantage
over exempt hospitals or might encourage some exempt hospitals to convert to
for-profit status rather than comply with the standard. However, this ignores
the fact that in today’s environment, having no effective charitable standard
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has resulted in a relatively small number of nonprofit hospitals shouldering the
bulk of the charitable burden for vulnerable communities. This puts them at a
huge disadvantage relative to their nonprofit competitors who fail to
acknowledge such charitable obligations. It is time to level the charitable
playing field with an enforceable and clear charitable standard reflective of
society’s expectations.
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